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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-2141
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
CHARLES LEWIS MATTHEWS,
Appellant
____________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. CriminalNo. 08-cr-00124-003)
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane
____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect or
Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
July 26, 2012
Before: RENDELL, HARDIMAN and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 17, 2012)
_________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_________
PER CURIAM
Charles Lewis Matthews, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals an order of
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denying his
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motion for a reduction in sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Because this
appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the
District Court.
In April 2009, Matthews pleaded guilty to one count of a superseding information
charging him with distribution and possession with intent to distribute an undisclosed
quantity of cocaine base. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The Plea Agreement noted that the
maximum penalty was 20 years of imprisonment. The Presentence Investigation Report
(“PSR”) indicated that Matthews was responsible for 353 grams of crack cocaine. Under
the Sentencing Guidelines then in effect, that drug quantity (between 150 and 500 grams
of cocaine base) resulted in a base offense level of 32. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. That level was
reduced by two points for acceptance of responsibility. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. But, because
Matthews had two prior felony convictions for controlled substance offenses, he was
classified as a career offender. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). As a career offender, Matthews‟
sentencing range was determined based on the table in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b). United
States v. Mateo, 560 F.3d 152, 154 (3d Cir. 2009). That table provides that a career
offender who faces a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison has an offense level of 32.
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Factoring in the same two-level downward adjustment under U.S.S.G.
§ 3E1.1, Matthews‟ total offense level was 30. With a mandatory Criminal History
category of VI, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b), Matthews faced a Guidelines range of 168 to 210
months of imprisonment. In a Judgment entered July 17, 2009, the District Court
sentenced Matthews to 210 months of imprisonment, to be followed by three years of
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supervised release.
We affirmed on direct appeal. United States v. Matthews, 373 F. App‟x 303 (3d
Cir. 2010). Matthews next filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, raising claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel. The District Court denied the § 2255 motion on the
merits. United States v. Matthews, No. 10-cv-1549, 2011 WL 183979 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 18,
2011).
In January 2012, Matthews filed a § 3582(c)(2) motion to reduce his sentence in
light of Amendment 750 to the Sentencing Guidelines.1 The District Court denied the
motion and Matthews appealed.2 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our
review of a district court‟s interpretation of the Guidelines is de novo, United States v.
Sanchez, 562 F.3d 275, 277-78 (3d Cir. 2009), and we review a district court‟s ultimate
disposition of a § 3582(c)(2) motion for abuse of discretion. Mateo, 560 F.3d at 154 &
n.2.
1

The District Court liberally construed Matthews‟ claims as being brought pursuant to
Amendment 750, even though he did not cite that Amendment in his § 3582 motion.
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Instead, Matthews relied on Amendment
706 to the Sentencing Guidelines, which “decrease[d] by two levels the base offense level
for crack cocaine offenses.” United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 219 (3d Cir. 2008).
Amendment 706 became effective on November 1, 2007, several years before Matthews‟
July 2009 sentencing. Under the plain language of § 3582, Matthews is ineligible for a
sentence reduction based on Amendment 706. § 3582(c)(2) (permitting a court to lower a
sentence where the applicable sentencing range was “subsequently . . . lowered by the
Sentencing Commission.” (emphasis added)).
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Although Matthews‟ notice of appeal was filed more than 14 days after the District
Court entered its order denying the § 3582(c)(2) motion, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(b), the
Government has not sought to enforce the time limitation. Virgin Islands v. Martinez,
620 F.3d 321, 328-29 (3d Cir. 2010).
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A district court may reduce a term of imprisonment under § 3582(c)(2) “only
when two elements are satisfied: First, the defendant must have been „sentenced to a
term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by
the Sentencing Commission;‟ and second, the sentence reduction must be „consistent with
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.‟” United States v.
Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 309 (3d Cir. 2009). The applicable policy statement provides that a
sentence reduction is not authorized if the retroactive amendment “does not have the
effect of lowering the defendant‟s applicable guideline range.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2).
In this regard, “the policy statement and § 3582(c)(2) are complementary.” Doe, 564
F.3d at 310.
Amendment 750, which took effect on November 1, 2011, lowered the base
offense levels for crack cocaine quantities listed in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c), to conform to
the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (“FSA”).3 In Mateo, we held that career offenders
sentenced under § 4B1.1 are ineligible for § 3582(c)(2) relief in light of Amendment 706,
which, like Amendment 750, lowered the base offense levels for certain quantities of
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The FSA amended 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) by, among other things, raising the amount of
crack cocaine that triggered mandatory minimum prison sentences. See Dorsey v. United
States, -- U.S. --, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2328-29 (2012). In response to the FSA, the
Sentencing Commission promulgated a temporary amendment that revised the crack
cocaine quantity levels in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. Amendment 750 re-promulgated as
permanent that temporary amendment. Id. at 2329. Although the Commission decided
that Amendment 750 should be applied retroactively, see United States v. Curet, 670 F.3d
296, 309 (1st Cir. 2012), the FSA itself is not retroactively applicable, where, as here,
both the offense and sentencing occurred before its enactment. United States v. Reevey,
631 F.3d 110, 114-15 (3d Cir. 2010).
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crack cocaine under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c). Mateo, 560 F.3d at 154-55. This is because
“Amendment 706 only affects calculation under § 2D1.1(c), and the lowering of the base
offense level under § 2D1.1(c) has no effect on the application of the career offender
offense level required by § 4B1.1.” Id. at 155. Similarly, because Matthews was
sentenced as a career offender under § 4B1.1, Amendment 750 does not affect his
applicable sentencing range. Cf. United States v. Lawson, -- F.3d --, 2012 WL 2866265,
at *3 (11th Cir. July 13, 2012) (holding that Amendment 750 did not lower sentencing
range for defendant whose “offense level and guideline range . . . were based on § 4B1.1,
not § 2D1.1, because he was a career offender.”). Thus, we conclude that Matthews is
not eligible for a reduction in his sentence pursuant to Amendment 750, and the District
Court did not err in denying his § 3582 motion to reduce his sentence.
We also reject Matthews‟ reliance on Freeman v. United States, -- U.S. --, 131 S.
Ct. 2685 (2011). In that case, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that a district court
may grant a § 3582(c)(2) reduction based on subsequently amended Guidelines where the
defendant entered a guilty plea agreement under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
11(c)(1)(C), which allows the parties to bind the district court to a pre-agreed sentence if
the court accepts the plea. Id. at 2690. Here, by contrast, Matthews‟ guilty plea did not
include a pre-agreed sentence pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C). See Lawson, 2012 WL
2866265, at *2 (noting that Freeman did not “address[] defendants who were assigned a
base offense level under one guideline section, but who were ultimately assigned a total
offense level and guideline range under § 4B1.1.”). Moreover, we recently held that
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“Mateo remains good law” following Freeman. United States v. Thompson, 682 F.3d
285, 286 (3d Cir. 2012). Finally, although Matthews appears to rely on United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), that case does not provide a basis for a sentence reduction
not otherwise permitted under § 3582(c). Mateo, 560 F.3d at 155-56.
For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District
Court. See Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.
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